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1. Introduction: The paradox of fiction 
 
Across cultures, humans create fictional worlds. Storytelling is a cross-cultural 
phenomenon, taking various forms, such as narrative dances that act out passages of 
the Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata, Latin American telenovelas, recitations by West 
African griots (troubadours) accompanied by a kora (21-string lute), and intricate 
Russian novels. Narratives elicit emotions. Like with other artworks, some of these 
emotions are evaluative, directed at the artwork as artwork. We may find a story 
beautiful, intriguing, exhilarating, or merely bland, predictable, or boring. Other 
emotions are directed at elements within the narrative, such as empathy with its 
characters. Chekhov’s play Uncle Vanya elicits empathy for Vanya and Sonya. When 
king Stannis Baratheon sacrificed his only daughter Shireen to ask for divine help in 
battle, viewers of the HBO show Game of Thrones watched in horror how the girl 
pleaded in vain to be spared.  
 There is an enduring discussion about the paradox of fiction. One version of this 
paradox concerns the possibility of emotions elicited by fiction. We know that Vanya 
and Sonya are not real persons, yet we feel empathy for them; we know that Shireen 
is not a real girl, yet we grieve for her. As Levinson (1990, 79) summarizes the 
paradox, “Since fictional characters do not exist, and we know this, it seems we 
cannot, despite appearances, literally have towards them bona fide emotions—ones 
such as pity, love, or fear—since these presuppose belief in the existence of the 
appropriate objects.” More formally, the possibility paradox of fiction holds that there 
is an inconsistency between the following three statements: 
Possibility Paradox 
PF1 We have genuine emotional responses to fiction.  
PF2 We do not believe that the characters and situations in fiction exist. 
PF3 We are only genuinely moved by things we believe exist.  
 Another version of the paradox of fiction (discussed by Radford 1975) focuses on 
the rationality of emotional responses to fiction. 
 Rationality Paradox1  
PF1* Our emotional responses to fiction are sometimes rational.  
PF2* We do not believe that the characters and situations in fiction exist. 
PF3* Emotions are rational only when we believe their objects exist. 
Radford’s original conclusion was that these emotions are irrational, even if they feel 
natural and intelligible to us. In the extensive literature on the paradox of fiction, the 
majority of authors do not think that emotional responses to fiction are irrational, and 
also believe that emotional responses occur frequently (see Davies 2009 for review), 
so one or more of the central assumptions of the possibility paradox must be wrong. 
Walton (1990) denies PF1: emotions elicited by artworks are merely pretend 
emotions2. Fictions are props that people use in games of make-believe, similar to 
how children use props in pretend games, such as playing house. When watching the 
movie Alien we do not genuinely fear the monstrous alien roaming the spaceship, nor 
are we genuinely concerned for the crew’s safety. While this proposal resolves the 
paradox (since there are no bona fide emotions involved), it creates its own 
difficulties. As Carroll (1991) has remarked, for children’s games the prop itself does 
not matter a great deal when creating the make-believe. A patch of leaves can be a 
castle, a stick a cannon. But for fiction, the artwork does make a great difference in 
whether or not we are moved. Many horror movies do not elicit fear but ridicule. By 
contrast, if the emotions are genuine we can easily explain why some horror movies 
work (because they genuinely horrify) and others do not (because they fail to move us 
in this way).  We cannot at will turn off emotions experienced in response to fiction, 
something that is not explained by Walton’s account.  
The second type of response denies PF2: people temporarily suspend their 
disbelief in the fictional situation they are encountering (Hurka 2001). For the time 
being, they really believe that, say, Gollum desires the ring. This position seems 
implausible. Under controlled experimental conditions, fiction tends to elicit higher 
degrees of emotional transportation (feeling absorbed by the story) than non-fictional                                                         
1 We thank Richard Joyce for this formulation of the paradox.  2 Walton’s response also diffuses the paradox as it pertains to rationality, since by 
denying that we have genuine emotional responses to fiction, he in effect denies PF1*. 
(newspaper) reports—and only transportation in fiction, but not in non-fiction, results 
in higher feelings of empathy (Bal & Veltkamp 2013). Green and Brock (2000) 
presented identical stories as either factual or purely fictitious. Respondents reported 
no difference in transportation between these conditions, yet one would expect that 
suspension of disbelief is easier with stories labeled as factual. Moreover, suspension 
of disbelief cannot explain why some delight in genres like tragedy or horror that aim 
to elicit negative emotions. Under experimental conditions, participants who watch a 
sad film enjoy themselves more when they are more transported by the story (Ahn et 
al. 2012). This correlation between enjoyment and transportation does not hold up 
when we learn about real-world sad events, where the opposite is the case.  
Given that the first and second statements are plausibly true, most responses to 
the possibility paradox of fiction involve a denial of PF3, i.e., they argue that 
existence beliefs are not necessary for emotional engagement with artworks. 
Lamarque (1981), for instance, proposes that we can really be moved by artworks: we 
do not enter pretend worlds, as Walton argues, but rather, we let the artworks enter 
our world. By considering fictional characters like Desdemona, or the nameless 
woman who is grieving for her dead child in Picasso’s Guernica, we form thoughts; 
although such thoughts cannot be objects of pity (and other emotions), they “can be 
pitiful and can fill us with pity” (Lamarque 1981, 294). Lamarque’s proposal solves 
the possibility paradox but not the rationality paradox: even if it can be shown why we 
have these responses, we have thereby not shown they are rational. Joyce (2000) 
argues that seeking out movies, books and other media that elicit emotions can be 
practically rational: when someone watches Doctor Zhivago, they plausibly know 
they will be sad, but if they watch the movie wanting to have this experience 
believing it will serve their ends, they are rational for watching it.  
Supposing the paradox of fiction can be resolved in a way that is philosophically 
satisfying, it remains “an interesting psychological question why certain kinds of 
affect persist after one learns of and forms the belief that objects of an emotional 
response are fictional” (Tullman & Buckwalter 2014, 794). Emotional engagement 
with fiction is indeed a peculiar feature of human cognition, which, given its cross-
cultural ubiquity, requires an explanation in evolutionary terms. In this paper, we will 
use the tools of evolutionary psychology, broadly construed, to explain emotional 
responses to fiction. In section 2, we look at some attempts to explain emotional 
responses in an evolutionary context. Section 3 proposes that fiction is a form of 
cognitive engineering. We propose two forms of successful cognitive engineering 
through fiction which both rely on emotions: the aims of nineteenth-century social 
reformers to change public opinion by making readers empathize with characters that 
were not normally part of their social circles (section 4), and the desires of readers 
and watchers of fiction to achieve transportation, a sense of being absorbed by a story, 
and in this way, to experience greater wellbeing and happiness (section 5).  
 
2. Explaining emotional responses to fiction in an evolutionary context 
 
Many authors (e.g., Aristotle, Hume, James) have proposed comprehensive theories 
about what emotions are, and how they could be categorized (e.g., basic emotions, 
social emotions). There is no consensus about what emotions are, for instance, if they 
are mainly consciously experienced physiological changes or if they have also 
cognitive content, nor is there consensus about what affective states count as emotions. 
In spite of this lack of definitional clarity, emotions have become an important field of 
study. Most evolutionary psychologists in the broad sense understand emotions as 
relatively short-duration states that involve physiological factors, such as muscle 
tension and cardiovascular changes, facial expressions, as well as attention and higher 
cognition. Emotions are crucial for how people approach social relationships, and for 
long-term health and wellbeing.  
Darwin (1872) was the first to propose an evolutionary, functional explanation 
for emotions: they help to prepare an animal for appropriate actions and to effectively 
communicate inner states, such as distress or anger, to others. Some evolutionary 
thinkers (e.g., Nesse 1990) argue that emotions are cognitive and physiological states 
that are shaped through natural selection. They contribute to fitness by helping an 
organism respond appropriately to threats and take advantage of opportunities. For 
example, anger directs blood away from internal organs towards arms and hands, and 
increases blood pressure, which is useful for direct confrontation in combat. Others 
(e.g., Keltner & Haidt 1999) have stressed the social effects of emotions: emotions, 
such as anger and embarrassment, influence other people; perceiving emotions plays a 
key role in social interactions, such as courtship and reconciliation. Displays of 
emotions, such as pride and embarrassment, help to negotiate group status and social 
roles. For example, embarrassment signals that someone is aware they have made a 
social gaffe that they are unlikely to repeat in the future, which may prompt others in 
the group to forgive them. Frank (1988) has hypothesized that moral emotions serve 
as “commitment devices”, compelling people to cooperate in social situations where 
there is a temptation to defect, and signaling to others that one can be trusted in doing 
so. 
Emotions elicited by fiction, and by art more broadly, do not fit neatly in these 
evolutionary scenarios. The situations depicted do not really occur, so how could 
emotional responses to fiction be adaptive? This problem can be termed the 
evolutionary paradox of fiction, which consists of a tension between the following 
three claims: 
 
EPF1 We have genuine emotional responses to fiction.   
EPF2 Emotions are functional adaptations that help us respond to threats and 
opportunities in our environment which impact our fitness. 
EPF3 Social and other situations depicted in fiction do not impact our fitness. 
 
There have been several attempts to resolve this paradox. One is to deny EPF1, 
that is, to argue that there is a qualitative difference between emotions elicited by 
artworks and those evoked by analogous real situations. Goldstein (2009) noticed a 
large difference between imagined and real (remembered) experiences. Adults who 
compared their experience of a gloomy film to an unhappy personal event 
experienced similar levels of sadness, but felt considerably less anxious watching the 
movie compared to recollecting personal experiences. This does not make the 
emotional responses to fiction any less puzzling though, since levels of sadness were 
similar, which seems prima facie not an adaptive response to a fictional situation 
(why be sad if nothing sad really happened?).  
Other authors qualify EPF2 by examining what happens when people 
emotionally respond to fiction. For example, Young (2010) draws on theoretical work 
by Paul Ekman and Paul Griffiths to argue that some emotional responses are 
involuntary and unconscious, and as a result do not always agree with our consciously 
held beliefs. Such emotions are elicited when the appropriate stimulus is present, 
regardless of our higher-order beliefs. In this way, emotions are indeed functional 
adaptations that help us respond to our environment, but as they are triggered 
automatically and, in the case of fiction, inappropriately, they do not always impact 
fitness. Emotions are adaptive responses to type events, e.g., jealousy makes us 
vigilant for potential partner infidelity, but things can misfire in particular token 
events, e.g., Othello wrongly believing his wife to be unfaithful. Perhaps emotional 
responses to fiction fall in this category of evolved emotions “misfiring” in particular 
token situations.   
The most common way to resolve the evolutionary paradox of fiction is to 
deny EPF3. Sugiyama (2001) and Tooby and Cosmides (2001) have proposed some 
form of the following thesis: narratives provide a simulation of real-world experiences 
that allow listeners to engage in vicarious learning. As Mar and Oatley (2008, 176) 
put it “Works of imaginative literature— stories—are one means by which we make 
sense of our history and our current life and by which we make predictions and 
decisions regarding our future world” (see also Steen & Owens 2001 who connect 
fiction to mammalian adaptations for play and imagination; see further [Chapter by 
Bateson]). Emotional responses help to make the learning experience more 
compelling. In this way, the emotions elicited through fiction are adaptive. Sugiyama 
(2001, 2011) compiled cross-cultural evidence showing that folktales in hunter-
gatherer societies often contain foraging information; there may have been multiple 
selective pressures for the transfer of information between older and younger 
members of a group through means of narrative: children and adolescents can 
vicariously learn about subsistence strategies through stories (e.g., what to do if there 
is a drought).   
Tooby and Cosmides (2001) also argue that fiction provides a risk-free 
environment where we can engage in vicarious learning. Confronting a lion in the real 
is a frightening experience; hearing a story about a predator (Little Red Riding Hood), 
or watching a predator in a movie (Jaws) is scary too, but we do not have the 
associated flight reactions. In this way, such stories are helping us assess the dangers 
of predators and offer appropriate responses. Tooby and Cosmides point to several 
features of storytelling, including its emotional involvement, as evidence that fiction 
is adaptive. The emotions elicited by fictional accounts augment our involvement 
with stories and increase our capacity to learn from them. Readers of Jane Austen’s 
Pride and Prejudice feel relief when Elizabeth rejects Mr Collins, who stands to 
inherit a fine estate but is a rather silly man (resources but no mate quality), and 
rejoice when she finally accepts the rich and high-principled Mr Darcy, sentiments 
that support judicious partner choice (resources as well as mate quality). Stories may 
also help to instill correct social behaviors and moral values, as in the Hindu 
Panchatantra (compiled around the 3rd century BCE), animal fables that are meant to 
instill nīti (wise conduct). For example, in the story Aparīkṣitakārakaṃ (“Rash 
action”), a Brahmin leaves his infant son in the care of his mongoose friend. Upon his 
return, the child has vanished, and the mongoose has blood on its snout. The Brahmin 
immediately assumes the mongoose has savaged his son, and kills the animal. 
However, he later finds that it defended his infant, who is alive and well, from a snake 
attack. The vicarious remorse the reader or listener of this tale feels instills a state of 
mind that guards against drawing hasty conclusions and acting rashly upon them. 
Variations of this story are widespread, e.g., the Welsh legend of Gelert the dog.  
While there is significant corroboration for the claim that fiction supports 
vicarious learning, this proposed function seems quite narrow when we consider the 
breadth and scope of fiction. Next to learning, people also engage in fiction for other 
reasons. For example, most readers of young adult fiction (fiction ostensibly aimed at 
readers aged 12 to 17, including such titles as The Hunger Games and Twilight) are 
adults. Presumably, adults enjoy these novels, which typically have less complicated 
plotlines, lots of dialogue, and engaging and straightforward storylines and characters, 
as a form of escapism from the drudgeries of work, commuting, and childcare. There 
is undoubtedly some vicarious learning at work in reading young adult literature. For 
example, one consistent theme in the Harry Potter heptalogy is helping misfits. 
Vezzali et al. (2015) found that children and adults who read these books exhibit less 
prejudice towards outgroup members (e.g., immigrants, gay people), an effect 
mediated by the extent to which they identify with its eponymous character. But 
engaging in young adult fiction, and the emotions it elicits, is more than vicarious 
learning—as we will argue, emotions in fiction can be marshaled for several 
functional goals, one of which is pure enjoyment.  
 
3. Emotional responses to fiction as a cognitive technology 
 
To understand the role of emotions in fiction, it is important to look at the motivations 
of both authors and consumers (readers, listeners, watchers, etc.). Why do they 
produce or consume fiction; what, if anything, do they hope to accomplish with it? Is 
the ability of works of fiction to move their audience a design feature? If it is, we can 
conceptualize the ability of narratives to elicit emotions as a form of cognitive 
engineering or cognitive technology.  
Technologies are ways in which organisms alter their environment. Pragmatic 
technologies meet pragmatic, practical ends, i.e., transformations of the physical 
surroundings. Cognitive technologies are not specifically aimed at altering our 
physical surroundings (though they may sometimes result in this), but at transforming 
our cognitive environment, including its epistemic and affective properties. For 
example, number words form a cognitive technology. As our evolved capacities for 
number discrimination are limited to 3 or 4, number words allow us to do something 
we would not be able to do otherwise, namely precisely denoting the cardinality of 
larger collections (Frank et al. 2008). Or take the use of calendrical notation systems 
as a way to predict cyclically occurring events. Our evolved systems for keeping track 
of time are quite fine-grained in the short term, but it is hard to keep track of 
relatively rare events that occur cyclically over the long term, such as the timing of 
herd migrations, the spawning of fish, or the flowering of trees (De Smedt & De Cruz 
2011). Calendars help to lift these cognitive limitations by keeping track of such 
cyclical events, which may explain their prevalence in human cultures since 30,000 
year ago, long predating the invention of writing.  
The examples of number words and calendars indicate two important ways in 
which cognitive engineering is achieved: language and material culture. Language can 
provide a ‘handle’ for attention, allowing us to focus on properties of the environment 
that would otherwise elude us (Jackendoff 1996). Material culture can help overcome 
cognitive constraints caused by limitations in memory (by providing external 
memory) and in conceptual stability (helping to stabilize concepts that would 
otherwise fluctuate, e.g., depictions of supernatural beings). Fiction not only uses the 
cognitive engineering potential of language, but often also of material culture. For 
example, to enhance the pageantry and immersiveness3 of a play, actors often use 
costumes, masks, makeup, and decors.  
Regarding fiction as a cognitive technology is consistent with a wide range of 
motivations for why people consume and produce stories, ranging from deriving 
unadulterated enjoyment to effecting societal change. We will discuss how fiction can 
be seen as a cognitive technology by focusing on two motivations for engaging in 
fiction. The first case study looks at fiction from the perspective of an author, 
showing how writers such as Charles Dickens and Elizabeth Gaskell used their novels                                                         
3  “Immersiveness” is a term from game design, meaning more than immersion; it refers to an 
interactive, multi-sensory experience of the narrative.  
to sway public opinion in the direction of social reforms. The second case study looks 
at why readers and watchers enjoy fiction that transports them into fictional narrative 
worlds.  
 
4. Expanding empathy and prosocial behavior through the social novel 
 
Social novels (also known as social protest novels) highlight problematic social 
circumstances, such as extreme poverty, slavery, or animal cruelty. By making their 
public aware of dire circumstances, they aim to marshal public opinion for social 
change. The genre particularly flourished during the 19th century. Dickens’ novels 
Bleak House and The Life and Adventures of Nicholas Nickleby, that highlighted 
abject living conditions and lack of medical care for the poor, helped support 
numerous social reforms that led to better living conditions in the UK. Harriet 
Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin played a pivotal role in the abolitionist 
movement in the United States in the 1850s. Ann Sewell’s Black Beauty has as 
narrator and protagonist a horse that goes from a relatively carefree life as a farm 
animal to the strenuous life of being a taxicab horse. Black Beauty is unabashedly 
anthropomorphic, yet the book is also rich in details about horse behavior and 
handling. As a direct result of the novel, bearing reins (which forced a horse’s head in 
a constant high position that was regarded as aesthetically pleasing, but that was 
awkward and painful for the animal) were forbidden in Victorian England.  
How do novels effect social change? Literature can be used as a cognitive 
technology to decrease the limitations of empathizing. Empathy is an important 
catalyst for prosocial behavior, but it is limited in scope. Humans find it easier to 
empathize with single identifiable individuals than with large numbers of nameless 
victims, and they are subject to similarity bias, being less able or willing to empathize 
with those who are different from themselves. In one study (Xu et al. 2009), Chinese 
and Caucasian college students witnessed people receiving a painful stimulation (a 
needle prick) or a neutral control stimulus (a touch with a Q-tip). Participants had to 
judge how painful the stimulus was while their brain was scanned using fMRI. The 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which is involved in perceiving one’s own pain as 
well as that of others, was more activated when participants saw the needle prick 
compared to the touch with the Q-tip. However, the ACC showed larger responses 
when seeing pain inflicted on people from the same racial group—this effect was 
similar in Chinese and Caucasian participants. In another study (Stürmer et al. 2006), 
German male Muslim and non-Muslim college students received a plea for help (to 
find short-term accommodation in town) from either a Muslim (“Mohammed”) or a 
non-Muslim (“Markus”) fellow student. In both groups, empathy only predicted 
helping intentions when the helpee was an ingroup member, but not when he was an 
outgroup member. Such findings can explain why people who are in a position to help 
fail to aid those who are part of marginalized outgroups. 
Social novels reduce similarity bias by decreasing the perceived difference 
between ingroup and outgroup members through several narrative techniques. One 
particularly effective, yet simple technique is to cast an outgroup member as the 
protagonist. Drawing on empirical research on discourse processing, the literature 
scientist Mary-Catherine Harrison (2011) finds that people tend to empathize more 
with the protagonist of a story than with secondary characters. Novelists frequently 
use the technique of foregrounding, “a kind of privileged focus that establishes the 
status of a protagonist within a text” (Harrison 2011, 266), for instance, by devoting 
more text to describing the thoughts and actions of that character, or by granting more 
introspective access to her inner states. As a result of this focus, readers can overcome 
the perceived otherness of outgroup members, and realize that they have a lot in 
common with characters who do not belong to their social circle. Authors do this by 
de-emphasizing differences, such as race, gender, or class, and by focusing on shared 
emotions, such as hopes and fears. For example, in Gaskell’s Mary Barton, middle-
class readers are invited to empathize with working-class characters by highlighting 
common concerns, such as dealing with unrequited love, losing a child, and choosing 
to marry for material convenience or for love.  
 
5. Transportation and enjoyment 
 
When looking at fiction as a cognitive technology, we need not only consider the 
producers of fiction, but also its consumers. Reading or watching a story is not a 
passive affair, but an active, reconstructive process. As fantasy and science fiction 
author Lois McMaster Bujold (2013) puts it, “The book, if you like, is not the story 
but merely the blueprint of the story, like the architect’s drawing of a house. The 
reader, then, is the contractor, the guy who does the actual sweat-work of building the 
dwelling. From the materials in his or her head, the ideas, the images, the previous 
knowledge, each one actively reconstructs the story experience.”  
 We will now briefly look at two motivations that readers have for engaging in 
fiction: experiencing different times, places, characters, and events, and escaping 
from their everyday lives. Both are achieved by transportation. Transportation is a 
metaphor coined by the cognitive scientist Richard Gerrig (1993) to describe the 
subjective sense of being absorbed and immersed in a story. Transportation into a 
narrative results in reduced attention for one’s surroundings and a diminished focus 
on oneself, and greater attention for the narrative. It involves a complex amalgam of 
emotions, mental imagery, and attributions of mental states (Green & Brock 2000). 
There is convergent evidence (see Green et al. 2004 for a review) that transportation 
contributes to enjoyment, which is an important motivation for readers and viewers to 
engage in fiction. Negative reviews of books on Goodreads frequently bemoan a lack 
of transportation (“I just couldn’t get into the story”), whereas positive reviews hail it 
(“The book gripped me from the beginning. I couldn’t put it down”). If transportation 
is indeed a desirable state, and if fiction can help to accomplish it, two questions arise. 
How does fiction result in transportation, and why does transportation contribute to 
happiness and wellbeing?  
Narratives create a sense of transportation by keying in on our evolved ability 
for self-projection. Neuroimaging studies have identified a common neural network 
(including medial prefrontal, medial temporal, and medial and lateral parietal regions) 
involved in retrieving personal memories, predicting personal future events, 
attributing mental states (theory of mind), and navigation (Buckner & Carroll 2007). 
These cognitive faculties are usually studied separately, but a meta-analysis (Spreng 
et al. 2009) revealed that there is an extensive functional overlap between them. 
Intriguingly, the same network is also active when participants are in a conscious 
resting state, the so-called default mode network (DMN) (Buckner et al. 2008). 
Buckner and Carroll (2007) propose that all the tasks carried out by the DMN require 
some form of self-projection. The self-projection theory provides a unified account 
for why an integrated functional network can perform such seemingly diverse tasks as 
remembering, predicting, navigating, and attributing mental states. When we 
remember an event in our personal past, we place ourselves in that situation and 
reimagine visual, tactile, olfactory, and other features of the event. For example, when 
Marcel Proust (1913) ate a madeleine cookie dipped in tea, it brought a host of 
childhood memories back to mind. When we think about our personal future, we 
project ourselves in a future state. When we imagine a hypothetical situation, such as 
visiting a museum, we project ourselves spatially, emotionally, temporally. A study 
with patients who were unable to recall personal memories found they were also 
unable to project themselves in hypothetical situations, such as lying on a tropical 
beach (Hassabis et al. 2007).  
Several neuroimaging studies indicate that narrative comprehension, such as 
reading Aesop’s fables (Xu et al. 2005), or nursery rhymes or vignettes made up by 
researchers (AbdulSabur et al. 2014), engage the DMN. Tamir et al. (in press) looked 
specifically at the components of fiction that contribute to activity in the DMN. They 
found two types of features that increased activity in brain areas that are part of the 
DMN: vivid descriptions of scenery led to increased activation compared to generic 
texts, especially in the medial temporal lobe subnetwork, and narratives that described 
social interactions resulted in greater activity in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. 
Additionally, several studies indicate a deep and sustained involvement of theory of 
mind in narrative processing, for example, performance of theory of mind tasks is 
improved in frequent readers. Mar et al. (2006) found a positive correlation between 
being a long-time reader of fiction, especially someone who is often transported into 
stories, and social acumen and empathy. It is difficult to tease apart cause and effect 
in this study—maybe people with a keen sense of social interactions are more drawn 
to literature. Under more controlled conditions, Black and Barnes (2015) found that 
after reading fiction participants perform better on theory of mind tasks, but not on 
intuitive physics tasks, compared to participants who read a non-fiction piece of 
similar length.4  
Taken together, these results support our following tentative hypothesis: the 
experience of being transported into a story is a result of an increased engagement of 
the DMN, which is otherwise mainly engaged in everyday self-projection activities, 
which happen spontaneously when one is not overtly focused on the external world. 
As originally coined by Gerrig (1993), transportation was a spatial metaphor, pointing 
to fiction’s ability to mentally place readers in a different location. But if the activity 
of the DMN results in the phenomenological sense of transportation, it not only                                                         
4 This latter study is a replication and extension of Kidd and Castano (2013), which reported improved 
performance in theory of mind tasks when reading fiction. However, it also proposed that so-called 
high literature is superior in improving theory of mind performance compared to popular fiction. This 
part of the study could not be replicated.  
involves a spatial component but also emotional and other elements. While better 
theory of mind comprehension is a salutary effect of reading fiction, it is not the main 
motivation for consumers of fiction. Instead, they enjoy transportation, and read or 
watch in order to be transported, even for a short while, in another world, inhabited 
with fictional characters —as one respondent to a Pew Forum survey5 on reading put 
it, “being able to experience so many times, places, and events.”  
A sustained engagement of the DMN contributes to feelings of wellbeing and 
happiness as it counters rumination and other forms of self-reflection, which are also 
subserved by the DMN. Several studies (see Mor & Winquist 2002 for a meta-
analysis) show an overall negative effect of self-directed thought on wellbeing: 
reflecting on one’s past, future, or things one could have done differently 
(counterfactual thinking) on the whole result in lower happiness and increased anxiety, 
the only exception being when one thinks of oneself in a very positive light, following 
a positive life event (e.g., a promotion at work). On the whole, self-directed thought 
includes a lot of negative elements, which even deliberate attempts to think positively 
about oneself cannot completely avoid (Nolen-Hoeksema et al. 2008). Transportation 
can enhance wellbeing by directing the functional activities of the DMN to the 
fictional world and its characters, away from one’s own situation and life. When we 
are absorbed in thinking counterfactually and theorize about fictional characters 
(What if Emma Bovary hadn’t married her boring country doctor?), we cannot at the 
same time ponder our own situation and life (What if I didn’t have this boring job?). 
While we are consciously aware of the fact we are reading a novel or watching a 
movie, the DMN is not aware of this, and is instead playing out what we are reading 
or watching. In this way, transportation can make consumers of fiction happier, as 
their attention is drawn away from negative self-directed ruminations. This 
explanation of the functional role of transportation also clarifies why emotions 
elicited through stories, including negative ones, may contribute to a positive 
evaluation of artworks. Since Aristotle, philosophers have wondered why tragedies 
are enjoyable to watch, in spite of their sad situations and the feelings of empathy one 
has for the unfortunate characters. Fiction that elicits deeper emotions achieves higher 
degrees of transportation, regardless of whether such emotions are negative or 
                                                        
5 http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/04/05/why-people-like-to-read/ 
positive. This may explain the observation of Ahn et al. (2012) that watchers of sad 




The paradox of fiction queries why people are emotionally moved by fictional 
situations and characters, while they know these are imaginary. Some versions of the 
paradox (notably Radford 1975) ask whether being emotionally moved by fiction can 
ever be rational. In this paper, we have examined the paradox of fiction from an 
evolutionary point of view. Emotions elicited by fiction do not neatly fit evolutionary 
explanations of emotional responses. It would seem that fictional situations do not 
directly impact our fitness, so how can emotional responses to fiction be adaptive? In 
this paper we have argued against this supposition (i.e., we reject the claim that 
emotional responses to fiction do not impact fitness), but argue that such responses 
are deliberately sought or engineered by producers and consumers of fiction. Fiction 
can be regarded as a cognitive technology that engenders emotions that are pursued 
by the readers or watchers. Some authors use narrative techniques to elicit empathy in 
order to transform the attitudes of readers to outgroup members. Some readers use 
fiction to achieve transportation, which helps them to be mentally situated in a 
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